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Promising recent research suggests that more cognitively demanding interviews improve
deception detection accuracy. Would these cognitively demanding techniques work
in the same way when discriminating between true and false future intentions? In
Experiment 1 participants planned to complete a task, but instead were intercepted
and interviewed about their intentions. Participants lied or told the truth, and were
subjected to high (reverse order) or low (sequential order) cognitive load interviews.
Third-party observers watched these interviews and indicated whether they thought the
person was lying or telling the truth. Subjecting participants to a reverse compared to
sequential interview increased the misidentification rate and the appearance of cognitive
load in truth tellers. People lying about false intentions were not better identified. In
Experiment 2, a second set of third-party observers rated behavioral cues. Consistent
with Experiment 1, truth tellers, but not liars, exhibited more behaviors associated with
lying and fewer behaviors associated with truth telling in the reverse than sequential
interview. Together these results suggest that certain cognitively demanding interviews
may be less useful when interviewing to detect false intentions. Explaining a true
intention while under higher cognitive demand places truth tellers at risk of being
misclassified. There may be such a thing as too much cognitive load induced by certain
techniques
Keywords: deception detection, Cognitive Load, episodic future thought, Future thinking, investigative
interviewing
Introduction
Recent approaches to deception detection focus on exaggerating behavioral diﬀerences between
liars and truth tellers by overloading a liar’s cognitive resources (Vrij et al., 2011a; Walczyk et al.,
2013). These cognitive load approaches (CLAs), have been shown to improve deception detection
accuracy beyond chance levels (e.g., 60% of observers could accurately identify if someone was
lying; Vrij et al., 2008). While these approaches show great promise, the boundaries have not
been fully tested (Walczyk et al., 2013; Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). In addition, certain conﬂicting
views exist suggesting that lying is not necessarily more cognitively demanding than truth telling
(e.g., McCornack, 1997; McCornack et al., 2014), and that the “beyond chance accuracy” is not as
robust a ﬁnding as initially believed. To date, the majority of studies examining the eﬀectiveness
of this approach require participants to lie or tell the truth regarding a past action, such as an
autobiographical or episodic event. An equally important goal is to assess whether these new
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approaches are useful to distinguish between true and false
intent, a situation in which a target event has not been
completed (e.g., a crime not yet committed). This is an important
question of signiﬁcant concern in applied contexts. For example,
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agents must
identify a person’s true intentions for boarding a plane, and
border patrol oﬃcers must identify a person’s true intentions
for crossing a border. The purpose of the current study is to
assess whether one CLA technique, the reverse order technique,
is eﬀective in aiding deception detection when interviewing
someone about his or her intentions.
Cognitive Approach to Deception Detection
A central concept in cognitive deception models is that lying
consumes more executive functioning resources (such as working
memory, attention, and inhibition) than truth telling (Gombos,
2006; Vrij et al., 2011a; Walczyk et al., 2013 for reviews).
Indeed, results of neuroimaging studies (e.g., Abe et al., 2006;
Gamer et al., 2007; Christ et al., 2009) and behavioral studies
(Walczyk et al., 2005; Debey et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2013; Visu-
Petra et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2013) provide support that
components of executive functioning underlie deception. For
example, behavioral studies suggest that performing a task that
interferes with executive processes while answering questions
truthfully or deceptively produced greater behavioral diﬀerences
(e.g., longer reaction times) between liars and truth tellers than
not performing the interfering task (Debey et al., 2012; Hu
et al., 2013; Visu-Petra et al., 2013). In neuroimaging studies,
brain areas (e.g., prefrontal cortex) associated with executive
processes are activated to a greater extent during deception
than truth telling (Christ et al., 2009). One interpretation of the
extant ﬁndings is that liars’ behaviors rely on particular executive
functioning resources because they must perform multiple tasks,
such as suppressing true details, constructing and explaining a
lie story, constantly revising and updating the story, all while
monitoring the reactions of observers (Walczyk et al., 2009). This
is one explanation why lying is more cognitively taxing than truth
telling under most conditions.
Cognitive load approaches exploit the already demanding
process of lying by making an interview more diﬃcult for liars
than truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2011a). One example of how
researchers utilize this approach is by asking interviewees to
tell their stories in reverse order. Vrij et al. (2008) found that
describing a past event in reverse order compared to sequential
forward order increased the cognitive load of the interviewees,
especially those who were lying. In fact, liars in the reverse order
condition were detected more accurately (60% accuracy in lie
detection) compared to the sequential forward order interview
condition (42% accuracy in lie detection). Police oﬃcers also
rated liars in the reverse order interview as “thinking harder,” and
being more “rigid” and “deliberate” in their responses than liars
in the sequential order interview.
Other methods of imposing cognitive load, such as asking
participants to recall events in their non-native language (Evans
et al., 2013), asking unanticipated interview questions (Vrij
et al., 2009), or presenting evidence in a strategic manner
[strategic use of evidence (SUE); Hartwig et al., 2006] have
exaggerated behavioral diﬀerences between liars and truth tellers
and increased discrimination accuracy as a result. While CLAs
show promise for detecting deception of past actions, the
boundaries of the technique needs further exploration (Walczyk
et al., 2013; Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014).
Detecting True and False Intentions
Most research on CLAs focuses on lying about past events, but
few research studies test the usefulness of these techniques when
interviewing regarding intentions (for a review see Granhag and
Mac Giolla, 2014). Recalling a past action involves retrieving
stored episodic memories from long-term to working memory,
whereas explaining future intentions relies on a kind of “mental
time travel” whereby a person imagines themselves participating
in an event in the future (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden,
2004). This is often referred to as episodic future thinking (EFT),
deﬁned by Granhag and Knieps (2011, p. 274) as “the ability
to mentally pre-experience one-time personal events that may
happen in the future.” Before applying CLA techniques to detect
intentions, it is important to understand the cognitive diﬀerences
between explaining a past action and explaining a true intention
(Granhag, 2010). In particular, understanding the diﬀerences in
cognitive demand involved in recalling a past action compared
to imagining a future intention would illuminate whether the
underlying assumption (i.e., lying is more demanding than truth
telling) of a cognitive load approach was met. If the underlying
assumptions were not met (i.e., lying is not more demanding
than truth telling regarding intentions) then CLAs would be less
eﬀective if used to identify intentions.
Granhag and Knieps (2011) argue that the EFT framework
is useful for understanding critical diﬀerences between true and
false intentions. In support of this, results of some studies suggest
that true intentions tend to involve more characteristics of EFT
than false intentions (Granhag and Knieps, 2011; Knieps et al.,
2013; see also Granhag and Mac Giolla, 2014 for a review). In
these studies truth tellers and liars are given 10 min to plan
a task (truth tellers) or mock crime (liars), but are intercepted
and interviewed before carrying out their plan (referred to as
the “Gothenburg Procedure” by Granhag and Mac Giolla). Truth
tellers are more likely than liars to report forming a mental
image of their task during the planning phase (Granhag and
Knieps, 2011; Knieps et al., 2013), which is one characteristic of
an episodic future thought.
Behavioral and neuroimaging research on EFT suggest that
imagining a true intention is a demanding task on its own. As
suggested by Warmelink et al. (2012), results of several studies
examining the phenomenological characteristics of imagery for
future intentions compared to memory for the past support the
idea that imagining the future is demanding (D’Argembeau and
Van der Linden, 2004; Gamboz et al., 2010). In these studies,
participants imagine an event based on one-word prompts (e.g.,
“wedding”), and are asked to think about a past memory or
future intention (that is likely to happen) related to the prompt
(e.g., participants recall when they attended a wedding, or
imagine the next time they will attend a wedding). Participants
tend to rate images of the future as less detailed and clear
than memories for the past. One explanation for these results
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is that imagining the future is a cognitively demanding task,
drawing on executive processes such asworking memory capacity
and reducing the ability for participants to imagine the future
in detail. In support of this interpretation, Hill and Emery
(2013) found that participants’ working memory capacity (a
measure of executive processing involved in deception) was
a signiﬁcant predictor for generating speciﬁc future episodes.
Higher working memory capacity was associated with generating
a higher number of speciﬁc future episodes. A few studies
examining the diﬀerences between true and false intentions show
similar results: truth tellers and liars provide a similar amount
of detail when imagining the future, whereas truth tellers tend
to include more detail than liars when recalling the past (Vrij
et al., 2011a,b; Warmelink et al., 2012). Further, as discussed in
Mac Giolla et al. (2015), holding a true intention may cause more
thought-intrusions regarding the future when compared to a false
intention. Evidence to support this is cited in Mac Giolla et al.
(2015). Truth-tellers hadmore task-related spontaneous thoughts
than liars before completing their intention, further supporting
that a genuine intention can demand a high degree of attention
even when compared to lying. Taken together behavioral data
provide indirect support that imagining a true intention is a
cognitively demanding task.
Neuroimaging studies also support that imagining the future
involves more cognitive demand than recalling the past. A central
argument of Schacter and Addis (2007, p. 773) is that, “since
the future is not an exact repetition of the past, simulation of
future episodes requires a system that can draw on the past
in a manner that ﬂexibly extracts and recombines elements of
previous experiences.” That is, imagining a future event involves
more cognitive processing steps than remembering the future:
imagining the past involves remembering episodic details of a
similar past event and then recombining those details to create an
imagined and plausible future scenario. Reviews of neurological
evidence support this interpretation, such that imagining a future
event tends to involve more neural activity than recalling the past
(Addis and Schacter, 2012). Taken together, neuroimaging and
behavioral data suggest that forming a true intention may be a
cognitively demanding task.
The Present Study
Cognitive load approaches rest on the assumption that liars,
but not truth tellers, will be under greater cognitive load when
responding to interview questions. Given that imagining a future
intention involves additional steps including the retrieval of past
memories and constructing a plausible scenario, recalling a true
intention may involve similar levels of cognitive load to lying
about intentions. Thus, the eﬀectiveness of some CLA techniques
may be reduced when trying to discriminate between true and
false intent. This study tests this question.
In the present study, we used a demanding cognitive load
approach, the reverse order technique, to test whether imposing
cognitive load will produce qualitative diﬀerences between liars
and truth tellers when interviewed about intentions. Liars and
truth tellers planned to complete a scenario similar to the
procedures of Granhag and Knieps (2011), but were intercepted
and interviewed before carrying out their plan. It was predicted
that asking liars and truth tellers to explain their intentions in
reverse order will induce high levels of cognitive demand that will
obscure behavioral diﬀerences between these groups and reduce
accuracy at detecting deception as a result.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined whether discrimination accuracy of true
and false intent is reduced when the interview involves the
reverse order technique compared to a control condition. Third-
party observers made truth and lie judgments after viewing
truth tellers and liars talking about their intention in reverse
order or sequential forward order. The main prediction was
that discriminating between truth-tellers and liars would be
worse in the reverse than sequential order interview. This is
because truth-tellers are hypothesized to experience an increase
in cognitive demand in the reverse order interview, and display
more deceptive behaviors as a consequence.
Method
Participants and Design
There are two principal parts in this study (1) the creation of
stimulus videos from interviews and (2) the collection of third-
party observers’ judgments.
Part 1
Participants were nineteen students (13 female, 6 male)1 from
a large university in a metropolitan city. Ten interviewee-
participants were in the lie condition and were actively trying to
lie about their intentions while the other nine were in the truth
condition. Two diﬀerent cognitive load interviews were used: a
low load (sequential forward order interview) and a high load
(reverse order interview). There were ten interviewees in the
low cognitive load condition (5 in the truth/low and 5 in the
lie/low) and nine in the high cognitive load condition (4 in the
truth/high and 5 in the lie/high). All interviewees were 18 years
of age or older and English-speaking and all completed various
measures probing their subjective experiences. The design was a
2 (Veracity: Lie vs. Truth) × 2 [Interview: Sequential (Low Load)
vs. Reverse (High Load)] between-subjects design.
Part 2
Participants (third-party observers) were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) to observe and make
true/lie judgments about the interviewees from Part 1. A total
of 157 observers watched the 19 interviews and rated whether
each person was lying or telling the truth, and how hard each
participant appeared to be thinking on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7
(Extremely). As an attention check and to ensure all participants
could adequately view the videos, participants were asked an
open-ended question about each video at the end of viewing
each clip: “Please describe the reason for your response. That is,
for what reasons did you decide that this person was lying or
1A total of 22 interviews were conducted. However, two clips were deleted because
the auditory or visual data were damaged, and one participant was deleted because
they failed to follow the interview instructions.
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truth-telling?” Participants were removed and excluded from all
analyses if they reported diﬃculty viewing or seeing the person
when answering this question. Participants were also removed
if they did not respond to these questions or wrote nonsense
responses (such as numbers). Participants were also excluded if
they took the survey more than once (as indexed by their IP
address). Approximately 16 observers were excluded, leaving a
total of 145 observers in the remaining analyses. A total of 145
observers were used in the remaining analyses. Approximately
43% of these observers were males, with ages ranging from 18
to 72 years of age (M = 35, SD = 12.83). A majority of observers
reported having a bachelor’s degree (41.4%), with the remaining
observers reported some college (23%), a post-graduate degree
(12%), an associate degree (12%) or high school or below (11%).
A majority of participants reported ethnicity of Caucasian (75%)
with the remaining participants reported Asian (9%), Black
or African American (6%), Hispanic (6%), Native American
(1%) or mixed (4%). An initial screening via options available
through the survey provider ensured that only participants in
the United States could participate. This was a 2 (Veracity: Lie
vs. Truth) × 2 (Interview: Reverse vs. Sequential) within-subjects
design.
Materials and Procedure
Part 1 included several phases that were designed based
on procedures from Granhag and Knieps (2011). First, each
interviewee was greeted, given an informed consent, and then
asked to plan and elaborate on a task during the planning phase.
Next, each interviewee was sent to carry out the task they planned
but was intercepted and asked to answer some questions about
their intentions during the interview phase. After the interview,
each interviewee completed a follow-up questionnaire during the
post-interview questionnaire phase.
Planning phase
After completing an informed consent form, participant-
interviewees were given instructions to plan and subsequently
carry out a task; they were told that they had 10 min to plan
and 15 min to carry out the task. Truth tellers were asked to
ﬁnd reference materials in the library on a government topic
(one periodical and one book). The library was chosen because
it is a moderately familiar place to all participants and is large
enough to ensure that participants would need to plan their task
considering the relevant periodicals and books they were to get
were on separate ﬂoors of the library; these criteria were chosen
based on Granhag and Knieps (2011) methods. The researchers
expected that this instruction would encourage participants to
plan an eﬃcient route and form a concrete plan because of the
wide spatial area they needed to cover in a short amount of time.
Liars received similar instructions and time frame as truth
tellers, except that they were told to steal the reference materials
from the library and were suggested to use some of their
time planning a cover story to conceal their true intentions if
intercepted. These instructions are based on the methodology of
Granhag and Knieps (2011), although the library task was novel
in the present experiment.
To assist with planning, each participant was provided with a
computer and given a link to the map of the library, a hard copy
of this map, and a link to the library website. At the end of the
10 min, the participant was escorted out of the room in which the
planning phase took place and asked, “What are you doing next?”
to ensure that the participant intended to go to the library.
Interview phase
After the planning phase, the participant was intercepted by
a confederate before reaching the library. The participant
was escorted to an interview room and asked to wait for
an interviewer. Before being interviewed the researcher who
was with them during the planning phase was escorted into
the interview room as if they had been asked to answer
questions as well. The researcher told the participant to be
as convincing as possible (truth tellers were told to “just be
honest” and liars were reminded to use their cover story and
not reveal their actual plans). The interviewer then dismissed the
researcher.
All interviews were video-recorded. The participant was
randomly assigned to an interview approach condition that
was either low or high in cognitive load. The interviewer was
blind to the veracity condition. In the low load condition,
participants were asked to describe their future intentions using a
sequential order interview procedure. In the high load condition
participants were asked to describe their future intentions using a
reverse order interview procedure. These instructions were based
on the interview instructions from Vrij et al. (2008), with slight
modiﬁcations to match the planned library task and to ensure
that participants were recalling their future intention rather than
a past action. Participants in the sequential order condition were
given the following instructions:
“I want you to tell me everything that you were going to do in the
15 min following from when you were intercepted. Therefore, you
should start your story with the ﬁrst place that you intended to be
when you were intercepted, and end your story with the last place
you intended to be at the end of those 15 min.”
Participants in the reverse order were given the following
instructions:
“I want you to tell me everything that you were going to do in the
15 min following from when you were intercepted, but in reverse
order. Therefore, you should start your story with the last place you
intended to be at the end of those 15 min, and end your story with
where you were when you were intercepted.”
Post-interview questionnaire phase
Immediately after the interview, the participants were escorted
back to the planning room and told that the role-playing part
of the experiment was over and they should ﬁll out the post-
interview survey as honestly as possible. This questionnaire was
designed to assess the subjective experiences of the participant
during the interview. Tables 1 and 2 provide the set of questions
used. As a manipulation check each interviewee rated the extent
to which they were lying or telling the truth during the interview
on a scale from 1 (Everything I said was a lie) to 7 (Everything
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TABLE 1 | Ratings of motivation and realism.
Truth tellers Liars
Sequential Reverse Sequential Reverse
M SD M SD M SD M SD
To what extent were you motivated to do the study? 5.60 1.34 5.25 0.96 5.40 1.14 4.80 0.84
To what extent did you expect to be interviewed about your intentions? 4.20 1.92 2.25 0.96 2.80 1.79 5.20 1.48
To what extent did you feel like you were a suspect being interviewed in a real-life criminal interview? 3.80 1.10 5.00 0.82 4.40 1.14 5.60 1.14
TABLE 2 | Ratings of subjective experience of psychological processes.
Truth tellers Liars
Sequential Reverse Sequential Reverse
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Cognitive load
Overall, how easy or difficult did you find the interview? 2.20 1.10 3.75 2.06 3.40 1.82 3.60 1.14
Convincing
How convincing do you think you were during the interview? 4.80 1.92 3.50 1.73 4.20 1.10 4.80 2.39
Nervousness
How nervous did you feel during the interview? 3.20 1.48 5.00 1.41 4.80 2.17 4.80 1.79
Mental imagery
Please rate how easy or difficult it was for you to answer the
following question during the interview: “Did you, at any point
during your planning, evoke a mental image of the future event?”
3.20 0.84 3.75 0.96 4.80 1.64 4.00 1.58
To what extent did you form a mental image of your errand during
the planning phase?∗
5.60 1.14 5.25 1.71 4.60 0.89 6.25 0.96
To what extent was your mental image characterized by. . .∗
Visual information? 5.80 0.84 5.75 0.96 5.60 0.89 6.00 1.41
Auditory information? 3.40 2.07 2.00 0.82 3.00 1.41 5.00 1.63
Smell? 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.40 0.55 2.00 1.15
Taste? 2.20 2.68 1.00 0.00 1.40 0.55 1.75 0.96
To what extent was your mental image characterized by clarity with
respect to. . .∗
Where objects were located in your mental image? 6.20 0.84 5.00 1.41 5.20 0.84 4.50 2.65
Where people were located in your mental image? 4.40 1.82 2.75 1.50 4.60 2.07 6.00 0.82
The following of one event after another in time? 5.00 1.00 4.25 0.96 4.40 1.82 5.50 1.29
To sum up your experience during planning phase how clearly did
you imagine yourself doing the future event?
5.80 1.64 4.75 1.50 4.20 1.48 4.75 2.22
∗Liars were asked to describe their cover story; truth tellers were asked to describe their intention.
∗One truth-teller in the sequential order condition did not respond to the mental imagery questions.
I said was the truth). In addition, participants rated the degree
of motivation and realism they experienced on 1 (Not at all) to
7 (Extremely) scales. As a manipulation check for the cognitive
load condition, participants rated, “Overall, how easy or diﬃcult
did you ﬁnd the interview?” on a scale from 1 (Extremely Easy) to
7 (Extremely Diﬃcult). Participants also rated their performance
during the interview on 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely) scales
for how convincing they perceived themselves to be, and how
nervous they were during the interview. Participants reﬂected on
the diﬃculty of answering one of the interview questions: “Please
rate how easy or diﬃcult it was for you to answer the following
question during the interview: ‘Did you, at any point during
your planning, evoke a mental image of the future event?’ on a
scale from 1 (Extremely Easy) to 7 (Extremely Diﬃcult). Finally,
participants were asked, “To what extent did you form a mental
image of your errand during the planning phase?” on a scale from
1 (A very low extent) to 7 (A very high extent), along with several
questions designed to assess the clarity and perceptual details
of the mental image formed (i.e., visual, auditory, olfactory,
gustatory, spatial, and sequential details) on scales from 1 (A very
low extent) to 7 (A very high extent). These questions, adapted
from Granhag and Knieps (2011), were designed to address
diﬀerences in the cognitive processes involved in imagining an
intention compared to a cover story. Several other questions were
asked as part of another study, participants were debriefed, and
course credit was provided in exchange for their participation.
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Part 2
This part involved the judgment component. Third-party
observers were recruited through Amazon’s M-Turk and
compensated $.75 in exchange for their participation. Data from
M-Turk subjects can be comparable to laboratory subjects, and
the M-Turk sample tends to be somewhat more diverse than
an undergraduate college sample (Buhrmester et al., 2011).
Observers completed a survey via Qualtrics in which they
watched all of the 19 video-recorded interviews. The mean
duration of videos was 52.84 s (SD = 8.92), ranging from 40 to
69 s. Participants indicated “yes” or “no” whether each person was
lying or telling the truth, and how hard each participant appeared
to be thinking on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely); several
other questions were asked as part of another study.
Results and Discussion
Prior to the main analyses, univariate and multivariate screening
procedures were performed on both the interviewee (n= 19) and
observer (n = 145) data sets. The 19 interviewee participants as
well as all observer participants were kept for the analyses.
Manipulation Checks2
Means and SD are reported in Tables 1 and 2. For all
manipulation check questions. Notable diﬀerences between
conditions are described below.
The lying condition
Liars lied more during the interview (M = 3.00, SD = 1.76,
n = 10) and truth tellers were more likely to tell the truth
(M = 6.67, SD = 0.71, n = 9) Cohen’s d = 2.68.
Motivation and realism
Participants in the reverse order (M = 5.3, SD = 1.0) reported
experiencing more realism than in the sequential order condition
(M = 4.1, SD = −1.1). Overall, participants were motivated to
participate in the study (M = 5.26, SD = 1.05) and felt like they
2Descriptive statistics were used exclusively as requested by a reviewer.
were real suspects being interviewed (M = 4.68, SD = 1.20).
Table 1 includes means and SD for these questions.
Engagement in the planning phase
Participants rated how diﬃcult the planning phase was on a
scale from 1 (Not at all diﬃcult) to 7 (Very diﬃcult). Overall,
participants reported low levels of diﬃculty during the planning
phase [M = 3.00, SD= 1.2, on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very)].
Liars (M = 3.80, SD = 1.69) reported more preparation for the
interview than truth tellers (M = 2.33, SD = 1.12).
Subjective experience of psychological processes
Table 2 reports these means and SD of these questions.
In sum, these manipulation checks show the expected results;
participants followed instructions, and were equally motivated
and engaged in the tasks.
Observers’ Judgments
Accurate identifications
Third-party observers’ proportion correct for liars (n = 10) and
truth tellers (n = 9) data were analyzed using a 2 (Veracity: Lie
vs. Truth) × 2 (Interview: Reverse vs. Sequential) within-subjects
ANOVA. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between veracity and
interview, as displayed in Figure 1, F(1,144) = 14.54, p < 0.001,
such that observers identiﬁed truth tellers (M = 0.47, SD = 0.25)
more accurately than liars (M = 0.36, SD= 0.21) in the sequential
interview; t(144) = 3.63, p < 0.001, d = 0.48 whereas observers
correctly identiﬁed liars (M = 0.40, SD = 0.24) and truth tellers
(M = 0.37, SD = 0.26) at about the same rate in the reverse order
interview, t(144) = 1.12, p = 0.265, d = 0.12. Further, and more
critically, observers were more accurate at identifying truth tellers
in the sequential than reverse order condition, t(144) = 3.68,
p< 0.001, d= 0.39 whereas liars weremarginally better identiﬁed
in the reverse than sequential order condition, t(144) = 1.81,
p = 0.073, d = 0.18. While these results show diﬀerences among
groups, it is important to note that these means are all below
chance levels (0.50). This suggests an overall diﬃculty in assessing
veracity of future intent accounts, which involve abstractions of
FIGURE 1 | The proportion of accurate identifications as a function of veracity and interview condition. An accurate true identification implies that
observers responded “true” when the participant was telling the truth. An accurate lie identification implies that observers responded “lie” when the participant was
telling a lie.
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events that have not occurred. See Figure 1 for a depiction of this
interaction.
Signal detection analysis
The non-parametric signal detection measures of A′ and B′′
were computed to assess discrimination accuracy independent of
bias. A′ measures discrimination accuracy and is an alternative
to d′ when used with forced choice answers. Observers’
discrimination accuracy did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between
sequential (M = 0.38, SD = 0.20) and reverse order (M = 0.35,
SD= 0.21) interview, t(144)= 1.22, p= 0.226, d= 0.15. However
there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in response bias as measured
by B′′, such that observers were more biased to say “lie” when
viewing interviews in the reverse (M = −0.06, SD = 0.31),
than in the sequential order interview (M = 0.05, SD = 0.27),
t(144) = 3.45, p = 0.001, d = 0.38. B′′ is a measure of response
bias (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999) and in this context it ranges
from −1 (extreme “lie” bias) to 1(extreme “truth” bias), with
values of 0 indicating no bias. In the reverse (p = 0.026) and
sequential (p = 0.016) order condition, bias diﬀered signiﬁcantly
from zero. This suggests that there was a signiﬁcant bias toward
responding “lie” in the reverse order condition, and a signiﬁcant
bias toward responding “truth” in the sequential order condition.
Objective assessment of cognitive load
To assess for perceived cognitive load, observers rated how
hard the participant appear to be thinking, from 1 (Not
hard at all) to 7 (Extremely hard). A 2 (Veracity: Lie vs.
Truth) × 2 (Interview: Reverse vs. Sequential) within-subjects
ANOVA detected signiﬁcant eﬀects of veracity, interview and
an interaction. Truth tellers (M = 4.34, SD = 0.93) were rated
as experiencing more cognitive load than liars (M = 3.73,
SD = 0.92), F(1,144) = 87.77, p < 0.001, d = 0.66. Participants
in the reverse order interview (M = 4.28, SD = 0.88) were rated
as experiencing more cognitive load than in the sequential order
interview (M = 3.80, SD = 0.93), F(1,144) = 72.67, p < 0.001,
d = 0.53. A signiﬁcant interaction between veracity and interview
was also detected, F(1,144) = 18.15, p < 0.001. While both truth
tellers and liars were rated as experiencing more load in the
reverse than sequential order interview, the magnitude of these
diﬀerences was greater for truth tellers, [(Reverse: M = 4.69,
SD = 1.06); (Sequential: M = 4.0, SD = 1.05) t(144) = 8.46,
p < 0.001, d = 0.65], than liars [(Reverse:M = 3.86, SD = 0.99);
(Sequential: M = 3.59, SD = 1.02), t(144) = 4.06, p < 0.001,
d = 0.27].
The prediction in Experiment 1 was partially supported;
those telling the truth about their future intent were less
accurately identiﬁed in the reverse order condition compared
to the sequential order condition. On the other hand, those
lying about their intent were (marginally) better detected in the
reverse than sequential order condition. Results of the signal
detection measure A′ partially support hypotheses such that
observer accuracy in the reverse order interview was similar when
compared to the sequential order interview. Further, inducing
cognitive load shifted response bias, yielding more judgments of
deception (rather than truth). These results may be explained by
observers’ reports of interviewees’ high cognitive load displays in
the reverse order condition (especially by truth tellers), compared
to the sequential order condition. A shift in response bias is
interesting because it suggests that in general, observers are
responding more liberally (adopting a “respond lie” response
bias) when viewing videos of interviewees experiencing higher
levels of cognitive load (the reverse, rather than sequential
interview), regardless of interviewee’s actual veracity. These
results support the hypothesis that when describing an intention,
liars and truth-tellers experiences are more similar, and cause
them to produce similar behavioral appearances (in this instance,
cognitive load and anxious appearances). In essence, the pattern
of results suggest that truth tellers in the reverse order condition
looked more like liars as a result of increased cognitive load.
These ﬁndings ﬁt with a new line of literature suggesting that
certain cognitive load manipulations are simply too cognitively
demanding – both liars and truth-tellers experience high levels of
cognitive load because of the manipulation and therefore appear
similar to one another (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). To examine
this interpretation further, Experiment 2 was conducted. The
extent to which truth tellers and liars displayed cues to deception
and truthfulness were assessed.
Experiment 2
Given that in the reverse order condition in Experiment 1 truth
tellers were at a disadvantage in terms of being identiﬁed correctly
and observers showed a lie bias, what interview behaviors could
have been revealed in this condition? In Experiment 2 a new
set of third-party observers were asked to determine the extent
to which interviewees in the various conditions displayed signs
of speciﬁc behaviors. These observers were experiment-blind
as to the purpose of the study. Thus, assessing deception was
never part of these observers’ evaluation. Based on the results
of Experiment 1, it was predicted that more behavioral cues to
deception and fewer signs of truthfulness would be evident in
the reverse order condition than the sequential order condition.
Moreover, this would be especially the case for truth tellers
discussing their true intent.
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 91 observers watched the 19 interviews and rated 10
behavioral cues. Participants were removed and excluded from
all analyses if they reported diﬃculty viewing or seeing the person
when answering this question. As an attention check, participants
were excluded if they did not respond to these questions or wrote
nonsense responses (such as numbers), or if they took the survey
more than once (as indexed by their IP address). Approximately
seven observers were excluded, leaving a total of 84 observers in
the remaining analyses approximately 49% of the 84 observers
were males, with ages ranging from 21 to 67 years (M = 34.90,
SD= 11.73). A majority of observers reported having a bachelor’s
degree (42%), with the remaining observers reporting some
college (26%), a post-graduate degree (8.3%), an associate degree
(10%), or high school or less (14%). A majority of observers
reported Caucasian ethnicity (not Hispanic) (74%), with the
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remaining participants reporting Black or African American
(11%), Asian (10%) or Hispanic (6%) ethnicity. Only participants
in the United States were allowed to participate. These observers
were independent, and did not participate in Experiment 1. All
19 videos from each condition were shown an equal number of
times. The design is the same as in Experiment 1, a 2 (Veracity: Lie
vs. Truth) × 2 (Interview: Reverse vs. Sequential) within-subjects
design.
Materials and Procedure
Third-party observers were recruited through M-Turk to
complete a survey on Qualtrics. They ﬁrst reviewed an informed
consent and then asked if they would like to participate. They
were asked to watch the 19 interviews and rate 10 behavioral
cues (e.g., how hard does the interviewee appear to be thinking?)
on scales from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely) after each video.
The four cues used in the current experiment (i.e., cognitive
load, anxiety, conﬁdent and convincing appearance, and control
behavior) were chosen based on results of Hartwig and Bond
(2011), along with other comprehensive meta-analyses (e.g.,
DePaulo et al., 2003; Hauch et al., 2014). For example, Hartwig
and Bond (2011) meta-analyzed the relationship between the
appearance of lie and truth behavioral cues and actual veracity
across 134 cues. In addition to other cues, their results suggested
that liars appeared to be thinking harder, more indiﬀerent, and
less spontaneous than truth-tellers. Truth-tellers appeared to be
more cooperative and relaxed, and produced stories that were
more realistic than liars. All questions used are listed in Table 3.
Finally, third-party observers were debriefed and paid $0.75 for
their participation.
Results and Discussion
Behavioral Cue Differences among Groups
For simplicity, nine of the ten associated behavioral cues
ratings from third-party observers were averaged to create three
variables: cognitive load, anxiety, and conﬁdent and convincing
appearance3. Table 3 presents average ratings for each item per
condition. A 2 (Veracity: Lie vs. Truth) × 2 (Interview: Reverse
vs. Sequential) within-subjects ANOVAwas run for each variable.
Cognitive load
Three questions were averaged to assess perceived cognitive
load appearance (all cues to deception, Cronbach’s α = 0.75).
There was a main eﬀect of veracity and order, and a signiﬁcant
interaction between veracity and order. Observers rated truth
tellers (M = 4.20, SD = 1.30) as experiencing signiﬁcantly more
cognitive load than liars (M = 3.33, SD = 1.21), F(1,83) = 44.77,
p < 0.001, d = 0.69. Observers rated interviewees in the reverse
order condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.25) as experiencing more
cognitive load than the sequential order condition (M = 3.57,
SD = 1.27), F(1,83) = 9.45, p = 0.003, d = 0.32. The signiﬁcant
3The cluster variables were created based on the face validity of the nine items.
Factor analyses were not appropriate given the number of variables and sample size
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2012). The Cronbach’s alpha values for the three clusters
were>0.75. The one question on controlled appearance was analyzed separately, as
it was not strongly associated with the items in the other variables. Note on Table 3
that the means on each question show similar patterns as those of the clustered
variables.
veracity by interview order interaction F(183) = 9.94, p = 0.002
shows that truth tellers appeared to experience signiﬁcantly
more cognitive load in the reverse order interview (M = 4.58,
SD = 1.29,) than the sequential order interview (M = 3.82,
SD = 1.32), t(83) = 4.25, p < 0.001, d = 0.58, whereas there
was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence for liars, p = 0.776. These results
are similar to those from Experiment 1 where a diﬀerent set of
observers judged the displays of cognitive load appearance in
interviewees. This result represents a robust eﬀect.
Anxiety
Two questions were averaged to create the variable anxiety (both
cues to deception, Cronbach’s α = 0.80). There was a main eﬀect
of veracity, and a signiﬁcant interaction between veracity and
interview. Observers rated truth tellers (M = 4.02, SD = 1.47) as
more anxious than liars (M = 3.26, SD = 1.44), F(1,83) = 29.93,
p < 0.001, d = 0.52. There was also a signiﬁcant interaction
F(1,83) = 4.99, p = 0.028, whereas truth tellers appeared to
be more anxious in the reverse order interview (M = 4.34,
SD = 1.57) than the sequential order condition (M = 3.71,
SD = 1.37, t(83) = 2.77, p = 0.007, d = 0.43, there was no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence for liars, t(83) = 0.19, p = 0.852, d = 0.03.
Confident and Convincing
Four questions were averaged to create the variable called
conﬁdent and convincing (all cues to truthfulness, Cronbach’s
α = 0.82). There was a main eﬀect of veracity and order, but
not an interaction. Observers rated liars (M = 4.00, SD = 1.33)
as more conﬁdent and convincing than truth tellers (M = 3.42,
SD = 1.28), F(1,83)= 21.53, p< 0.001, d = 0.44. Observers rated
interviewees in the sequential interview condition (M = 3.87,
SD = 1.30) as more conﬁdent and convincing than interviewees
in the reverse order condition (M = 3.55, SD = 1.31),
F(1,83) = 4.67, p = 0.033, d = 0.35.
Control
Observers also rated the degree of control displayed by each
interviewee, a cue to deception. There were no signiﬁcant eﬀects
on this question (Fs< 3.51).
In Experiment 2 the prediction that more behavioral cues
associated with lying and fewer signs of truthfulness would
be evident in the reverse than the sequential order condition
was conﬁrmed with measures of cognitive load and conﬁdent-
convincing appearance. More importantly, the second prediction
(that this eﬀect would be especially the case for interviewees
discussing their true intent) was conﬁrmed with measures of
cognitive load, anxiety, and conﬁdent-convincing appearance.
These results support those of Experiment 1 suggesting that
because truth tellers showed more behavioral signs of deception
and fewer signs of truthfulness, accuracy in identifying them
correctly was reduced in the reverse order interview. Surprisingly,
truth-tellers displayed more behavioral cues than liars in the
reverse order condition. These results suggest that truth tellers
are actually more cognitively loaded than liars when a CLA
technique was used. Together these results support that a CLA
approach such as the reverse order interview may not be useful
for discriminating between true and false intentions: truth-tellers
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TABLE 3 | Ratings for behavioral cues to deception as a function of interview type and veracity.
Truth tellers Liars
Sequential Reverse Sequential Reverse
Behavioral cues of deception M SD M SD p d M SD M SD p d
Cognitive demand 3.82 1.32 4.58 1.29 <0.001 0.58 3.31 1.22 3.36 1.2 0.776 0.04
How hard does the interviewee appear to be
thinking?∗
4.1 1.53 5.06 1.5 <0.001 0.63 3.57 1.58 3.79 1.47 0.314 0.14
How much difficulty does the interviewee appear to
be having in answering the questions?
3.96 1.78 4.81 1.71 0.002 0.46 3.31 1.67 3.46 1.61 0.537 0.09
How distracted does the interviewee appear? 3.38 1.65 3.88 1.84 0.039 0.29 3.04 1.77 2.83 1.5 0.382 0.13
Anxiousness 3.71 1.38 4.34 1.57 0.007 0.43 3.28 1.54 3.24 1.35 0.852 0.03
How anxious does the interviewee appear? 4.13 1.6 4.63 1.63 0.058 0.31 3.23 1.67 3.27 1.5 0.847 0.03
How much does the interviewee appear to fidget? 3.29 1.68 4.05 1.84 0.005 0.43 3.33 1.66 3.2 1.57 0.603 0.08
Confident and convincing appearance 3.59 1.21 3.24 1.34 0.071 0.27 4.14 1.38 3.87 1.28 0.195 0.2
How detailed are the interviewee’s responses? 4.1 1.5 3.62 1.76 0.049 0.29 4.31 1.64 3.62 1.64 0.01 0.42
How spontaneous is the interviewee? 3.25 1.4 3.3 1.57 0.797 0.03 3.82 1.63 3.79 1.5 0.868 0.02
How confident does the interviewee appear? 3.25 1.61 2.83 1.57 0.1 0.26 4.27 1.65 3.92 1.72 0.171 0.21
How convincing is the interviewee? 3.77 1.7 3.2 1.68 0.023 0.34 4.15 1.83 4.17 1.54 0.965 0.01
Controlling
How controlled is the interviewee’s posture? 4.06 1.65 3.95 1.63 0.684 0.07 4.45 1.43 4.05 1.54 0.102 0.27
∗There were 84 observers in total. However, there was one missing response to the “Thinking Hard” item (for truth tellers only) and “Difficulty” item (for liars only).
looked more like liars, whereas liars displayed similar behaviors
regardless of interview technique.
General Discussion
This study investigated the applicability of a cognitively
demanding interview as a viable option to detect deceptive
intentions. Speciﬁcally, this study tested whether subjecting
individuals to the reverse order interview technique (a high
cognitive load interview) would enhance deception detection
accuracy compared to a sequential order interview technique
(a low cognitive load interview). There were three principal
ﬁndings. First, an interaction was detected between veracity and
interview order such that the reverse compared to sequential
order interview condition lowered accurate identiﬁcations for
truth tellers more than liars. Second, third-party observers
rated those in the reverse order interview as thinking harder
(experiencing more cognitive demand) than the sequential
interview; the magnitude of this diﬀerence was greater for truth
tellers than liars. Third, truth tellers exhibited more behavioral
cues indicative of deception and less behavioral cues indicative of
truth during the reverse, but not sequential interview condition.
Why did a reverse order technique fail to increase accuracy
at discriminating between liars and truth-tellers? Answering
questions regarding one’s true intent may be a cognitively
demanding task. This is why observers’ had a bias to call
all interviewees “liars” when viewing reverse-order interviews.
Further and more surprising was the fact that the cognitively
demanding, reverse order technique impacted truth tellers more
than liars: two independent groups of third-party observers rated
truth tellers as thinking harder in the reverse than sequential
order interview, and the magnitude of this diﬀerence was greater
when compared to liars. The CLAs are intended to overload
liars more than truth tellers because lying typically requires more
cognitive resources than truth telling. In this study, truth tellers
may have experienced similar (or greater) levels of cognitive
demand compared to liars. As a consequence, truth tellers were
misidentiﬁed more in the reverse than sequential order condition
whereas liars were identiﬁed at about the same rate in both
interviews.
Why did truth-tellers experience an increase in deceptive
behaviors, even more so than liars? One explanation for this
is that liars and truth-tellers utilize unique strategies when
responding to questions, and these strategies rely on cognitive
processes such as executive functioning to diﬀerent degrees.
Research on past actions suggests that truth-tellers’ strategies
typically involve simply telling the truth. This is because truth-
tellers tend to believe that their truth will be apparent to
observers, thus just explaining their intention as they expected
the events to occur would suﬃce. If this strategy holds true
for intentions, explaining a true intention may be an especially
demanding task that relies heavily on executive processes. As
a consequence, when completing a diﬃcult interview task such
as explaining an event in reverse order, truth-tellers’ ability
to appear truthful may be reduced. Indeed, research on EFT
suggests that envisaging oneself carrying out future events
involves multiple information processing steps that rely on
executive processing, such as recombining past experiences
with future intended actions, choosing plausible temporal-spatial
coordinates to imagine the intended actions, and combining
these and other steps together to create the whole intention
(D’Argembeau et al., 2010; de Vito et al., 2012). Truth-tellers in
this study explained an intention that involves constructing an
image of themselves carrying out a series of activities that are
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novel and then reporting on that event. Thus, it is hypothesized
that the additional cognitive demand associated with EFT
reduced the truth teller’s capacity to appear truthful when placed
in a demanding situation (i.e., reverse order interview).
Liars, however, may have relied on strategies that avoid the
diﬃculty involved in EFT. For example, one liar explained post-
interview that she answered her interview questions by describing
a habitual activity (walking through the library to go to basketball
practice) that she performed every week during the same time.
Explaining this schema-like memory may have been less eﬀortful
than explaining a true, detailed intention about a novel series of
events. Future research should consider how strategies impact
the eﬀectiveness of CLA techniques, and consider the speciﬁc
cognitive processes involved.
Low Accuracy Rates
Why were observers so abysmal (below chance levels in
Experiment 1) at discriminating between liars and truth-tellers?
A widely cited meta-analysis (Bond and DePaulo, 2006) suggests
that deception is detected at just above chance levels (i.e., 54%);
the accuracy rates in this study are not even close. Unfortunately,
there is no meta-analytic data on the accuracy of detecting true
and false intentions so it is unclear what the accuracy rate is
for detecting a true or false intention. In addition, the studies
that have examined accuracy at discriminating between true
and false intentions do not typically utilize human observers
for computing discrimination accuracy between true and false
intentions. Only two studies that the authors are aware of have
used human observers. In Warmelink et al. (2011), the accuracy
data is reported from n = 2 observers who detected 76% of
truth tellers and 77% of liars. The second study by Vrij et al.
(2011b) asked observers to read transcripts of interviews, and
showed an accuracy rate of about 70%. The conclusions that can
be drawn regarding general accuracy at discriminating between
true and false intentions based on only these two studies are
limited. InWarmelink et al. (2011), only two observers were used.
In addition, these interviewers asked 11 questions about diﬀerent
topics related to the senders’ intentions. As suggested by research
from Masip et al. (2009), Street and Masip (2015), observers
(interviewers) often improve their deception detection accuracy
during the course of an interview when using multiple compared
to single questions because of the improved ability to evaluate
senders’ consistency to diﬀerent questions. This may be another
explanation for the increased accuracy of the two interviewers
in Warmelink et al. (2011) when compared to our study. Based
on the limited availability of data regarding observer accuracy
discriminating between true and false intentions, it is unclear
what the average accuracy rate is discriminating between true and
false intentions and therefore not necessarily unusual that our
accuracy rates are low. Instead, it is possible that discriminating
between true and false intent is indeed diﬃcult under certain
circumstances as in this study.
Relationship to Other Cognitive Lie Detection
Approaches
The current study provides preliminary evidence that a reverse
order technique may not be useful when interviewing someone
about his or her intentions. However, results of at least one
study suggest lying about an intention is more cognitively
demanding than telling the truth, similar to research on past
actions (Suchotzki et al., 2015). Suchotzki et al. (2015) found that
lying about a past action or future intention produced longer
RTs than telling the truth, suggesting that there is a higher
cognitive cost to telling a false than true intention. However,
the interview task was an adaptation of the Scheﬃeld Lie Test,
a “yes/no” paradigm that may be less desirable in situations
where gathering intelligence is necessary, and likely demands less
cognitive resources from an interviewee to appear truthful than
answering open-ended questions during a CLA.
Results of other studies reveal mixed results regarding the
eﬀectiveness of CLAs for detecting intentions. For example,
the SUE technique was eﬀective whereas using unanticipated
questions depends on the type of questions asked. Some studies
suggest that asking unanticipated questions about the past
(inquire about the activities while planning an intention, such
as details about rental cars or hotel reservations when traveling),
or presenting evidence strategically about the past, are eﬀective
techniques for enhancing diﬀerences between liars and truth
tellers (Clemens et al., 2011; Sooniste et al., 2013). Results of
another study suggest that only certain unanticipated questions
(i.e., inquiring about transportation plans) are eﬀective at eliciting
diﬀerences between liars and truth tellers (Warmelink et al.,
2012). Further, asking unanticipated questions about planning in
small groups of suspects showing mixed results. In one study,
the diﬀerence between liars and truth-tellers on measures such
as within-group consistency in small groups of suspects were
similar when asking unanticipated or anticipated questions (Mac
Giolla and Granhag, 2014). However, in another study truth-
tellers showed higher within-group consistency levels than liars
for unanticipated but not anticipated questions (Sooniste et al.,
2014).
It is still unclear what mechanisms underlie these various types
of CLAs (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). What is clear from results
of previous studies and the current study is that some categories
of CLAs may be more or less useful with identifying intentions.
The eﬀectiveness of such approaches may depend on the
interaction between the demands of the imposed load technique
and the mental processes involved. Future research should focus
on these interactions, investigating cognitive mechanisms and
boundary conditions of these techniques so that CLAs can be
calibrated and applied appropriately for use in the ﬁeld
It is important to note that the sender sample, which makes up
the stimulus materials in this study was relatively small (10 liars
and 9 truth-tellers). Although not atypical in recent lie detection
research (e.g., Blair et al., 2010; Leal et al., 2010; Evans et al.,
2013) this could be a limitation in generalizing our results. In
a recent meta-analysis investigating multiple cues and various
artifacts aﬀecting accuracy, it was revealed that out of 144 studies
the average number of senders per study was 64 (Hartwig and
Bond, 2011). This same meta-analysis, however, showed that lie
detection was not signiﬁcantly related to the number of senders.
Additionally in a recent reverse order study by Evans et al.
(2014) eight total videos (four in a reverse order and four in a
chronological order interview) of true and false alibi statements
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were used. Thus, our procedure is in line with recent studies and
ﬁndings should not reﬂect an artifact of our stimulus materials.
Conclusion
This study shows the complexities of using a cognitive load
approach, especially when examining intentions. The results of
this study suggest that in certain situations, such as explaining
an intention, liars and truth tellers may experience similar levels
of demand. These situations may reduce the eﬀectiveness of
the cognitive load approach by increasing the number of false
accusations of truth tellers. Certain CLA techniques such as the
reverse order interview may be ineﬀective for detecting deceptive
intentions, mainly because the reverse order interview makes it
diﬃcult to appear honest. Put another way, there may be such
a thing as too much cognitive load, especially for truth tellers.
Practitioners attempting to apply new cognitive load techniques
to interview suspects must take these ﬁnding into account to
protect innocent individuals from being misclassiﬁed.
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